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ABSTRACT
Biologics are complex medicines which are often genetically
engineered, and which are sure to play an important role in curing
some of humankind’s worst diseases. Not surprisingly, generic
companies want a part of the biologic market. The FDA believes
that it has the authority to approve off-patent versions of biologics
that were originally regulated under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic
Act, but in order to effectively do so the FDA would have to rely on
findings based on data produced by the brand name companies.
This iBrief examines whether the FDA’s reliance on previous
findings would give rise to a valid claim under the Takings Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. In the end, it concludes that the FDA’s
proposed action likely would not constitute a taking.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Many of the most promising advances in medicine belong to a class
of compounds called biologics. Biologics are complex, large molecules that
are often created by recombinant DNA technology.2 One prominent
example of a biologic is Amgen’s Epogen®, a genetically engineered form
of erythropoietin which combats anemia by stimulating the production of
red blood cells.3 Sales of Epogen® during the second quarter of 2004
topped $633 million.4 Indeed, the total market for biologics in 2003 has
been estimated at $30 billion and is projected to reach $60 billion by 2010.5

The research and development costs associated with biologics are
high because biologics are structurally complex and difficult to
¶2
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manufacture.6 One industry leader, Genentech, estimated that it has
invested $6.4 billion in research over the last 28 years.7 Amgen, in one year
alone, spent $1.7 billion on research.8 These high costs are then passed on
to consumers, who often foot bills for biologic treatments ranging anywhere
from $10,000 to $25,000 a year.9 In some rare cases, costs can exceed
$170,000 per year.10
¶3
However, consumers may see reduced costs for biologic treatments
once many of the key biologic patents expire. Indeed, many of these key
patents are approaching expiry.11 In the past, one important way that
Congress has successfully lowered prices for consumers is through
encouraging generic competition.12 The Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984,13 which is generally known as the HatchWaxman Act, amended the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).14 The
Hatch-Waxman Act encouraged market entry of generic drugs by
establishing an abbreviated pathway for generic approval. By most
accounts, the Hatch-Waxman Act has been successful at walking the fine
line between encouraging generic competition and respecting the
intellectual property rights of brand-name innovators.15
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The approval of generic, or off-patent,16 biologic treatments is more
complicated because most biologics are not approved under the FDCA, but
rather under the Public Health Services Act (PHSA),17 which does not
contain any provision regarding generic approval.18 Without this sort of
provision in the PHSA, a manufacturer of an off-patent biologic is required
to submit to the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) independent clinical
studies that support the manufacturer’s assertion that the product is safe and
effective.19 Requiring the manufacturer to provide its own complement of
studies may be warranted in some situations, but in other cases the data may
be identical to the data originally supplied by the innovating company.20
This submission of duplicative data by the off-patent company is inefficient
and delays the price-lowering benefits of competition.
¶4

Aside from statutorily shortening the approval process, several
scenarios have been formulated to speed off-patent biological products to
market. One scenario envisions that the FDA could interpret a provision for
generic approval into the existing PHSA.21 Another possible scenario sees
the FDA reclassifying biologics as drugs and applying the Hatch-Waxman
Act.22 A third scenario is that the FDA could apply the Hatch-Waxman Act,
only to the small set of biologics that were originally approved under the
FDCA.23
¶5

REV. 18 (2003) (for an account of how Hatch-Waxman was recently amended in
response to loopholes).
16
“Generic” and “off-patent” refer to the same proposition with regard to
biologics, but usage has been a contentious matter since both terms have similar
yet unique connotations. At root is the empirical question of whether generic
biologics truly exist, since biologics are dependent so heavily on the
manufacturing process. Brand name firms contend that the term generic is
inapplicable and prefer the broader, more catch-all, off-patent. Generic firms
contend the opposite. This remains an open question and this paper attempts to
remain impartial. See Hearing, supra note 2 (response to follow-up questions
by William B. Shultz, representing the Generic Pharmaceuticals Association).
17
42 U.S.C. § 262 (2000).
18
Christine Hines, Pressure Rises for FDA, Congress in Latest Drug Duel;
Generic, Brand-name Drug Makers Face Off Over the Future of Biologics,
LEGAL TIMES, Jul. 12, 2004, at 1.
19
See id.
20
See Hearing, supra note 2, at 2-3 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
21
See DONALD O. BEERS, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA
APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS §13.03 (Supp. 2003).
22
See Hearing, supra note 2, at 119 (prepared statement of Carole Ben-Maimon,
Barr Laboratories).
23
See Melissa R. Leuenberger-Fisher, The Road to Follow On Biologics: Are
We There Yet?, 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L. REP. 389, 390 (2004).
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While the FDA has refused to apply the Hatch-Waxman Act to
biologics that were originally approved under the PHSA,24 the FDA
believes that it has the authority to approve off-patent biologics originally
regulated under the FDCA.25 However, under this scenario, by approving
the off-patent biologic the FDA would need to rely on the previous finding
of safety and effectiveness associated with the brand name biologic.
According to brand name firms, this action is a use of trade secret data, and
that such use by the FDA would violate the Takings Clause of the
Constitution.26
¶6

¶7
This iBrief analyzes the takings argument. In doing so it examines
the United States Supreme Court’s takings case law, and puts particular
focus on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto.27 In Monsanto, the Court examined
how the Takings Clause of the United States Constitution applies to trade
secrets and government regulation; its analysis turned on whether a
company had “reasonable investment-backed expectation.”28 In the end,
this iBrief concludes that it would be difficult for brand name firms to prove
that they had “reasonable investment-backed expectations” in their safety
and effectiveness data, such that the FDA could not rely on these earlier
findings in order to approve off-patent equivalents of biologics which were
originally approved under the FDCA.29

I. THE REGULATION OF DRUGS AND BIOLOGICS
¶8
The regulatory framework for approving and monitoring medicines
is complicated and rarely intuitive. Thus, it is valuable to provide a short
orientation to the regulatory process. The FDCA requires that new drugs
undergo close scrutiny for safety and effectiveness before they can reach the

24

21 C.F.R. § 314.101(e)(1).
See Hearing, supra note 2, at 134 (prepared statement of Dr. David Crawford,
Acting Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration).
26
See Citizen’s Petition, supra note 7, at 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
27
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
28
Id. at 1005.
29
It is important to be candid about what this iBrief does not purport to argue:
whether data used to support biologics passed under the PHSA can be relied on
by the FDA to approve off-patent biologics under the Hatch-Waxman provisions
of the FDCA. Indeed, brand name biologics might have a strong case for a
takings claim in light of the lack of any generic provision in the PHSA coupled
with multiple assurances by the FDA against this sort of treatment. Lastly, a
word of caution, even though it might not be a taking to evaluate a select
number of biologics already regulated under the FDCA, it still may be unwise to
do so. New legislation may be the better course for several reasons, including
the development of a clear legislative record and an unambiguous and simplified
process for generic approval.
25
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market.30 Drugs are defined under the FDCA in part, as “articles intended
for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease
in man or other animals” and also as “articles (other than food) intended to
affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals.”31
Drugs are evaluated and approved by the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research at the FDA.32
¶9
Biologics, on the other hand, are regulated under the PHSA and are
evaluated by the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER).33
It has been noted, however, that the FDCA’s definition of a drug is so broad
that it actually encompasses most biologics.34 Indeed, some biologics like
insulin and human growth hormone are already regulated by the FDA under
the FDCA. However, these delegations to the FDA are merely the result of
historical practice and are not supported by any scientific rationale.35

The idea of relying on the safety and efficacy of first generation
drugs to shorten the approval process of generic drugs did not begin with
Hatch-Waxman.36 For example, applicants were allowed to rely on a
finding of effectiveness for pre-1962 drugs under the Drug Efficacy Study
Implementation program (DESI).37 However, the Hatch-Waxman Act
provided a more elaborate system of generic approval.38 First, under
§505(j), an applicant is permitted to file an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA).39 Under this section, generic manufacturers are not
required to duplicate the safety and effectiveness studies performed by the
brand name innovator if several statutory requirements are satisfied.40 One
of the most important requirements is a showing of bioequivalence between
the generic and brand name product.41 However, unlike chemically¶10

30

See JAMES T. O’REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION §13.4 (2004).
21 U.S.C. §321(g)(1) (2000); See also Jay M. Zitter, What is “Drug” Within
§201(g)(1) of the Food, Drug, And Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C.A. 321(g)(1)), 127
A.L.R. FED. 141 (for a detailed examination of the contours of the definition of
“drugs”).
32
FDA, Intercenter Agreement Between the Center for Drug Evaluation and
Research and the Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research, III(A)(6) (Oct.
31, 1991) [hereinafter Intercenter Agreement].
33
See id.
34
Edward L. Korwek, Human Biological Drug Regulation: Past, Present, and
Beyond the Year 2000, 50 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 123, 126 (50th Anniversary
Special Issue, 1993).
35
See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 23, at 391.
36
Id. at 389.
37
Id.
38
See id. at 389-90.
39
21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
40
Id.
41
Id.
31
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synthesized drugs, where a showing of bioequivalence is relatively
straightforward, proving bioequivalence between biologics is fraught with
difficulty.42 Due to the unique physical properties of biologics, additional
clinical studies may be necessary to prove bioequivalence. Therefore, using
§505(j) of the FDCA, which requires strict bioequivalence, may not be
appropriate to approve off-patent biologics.43
Section 505(b)(2) of the Hatch-Waxman Act44 holds more promise
for off-patent biologics, since it provides a more flexible approach to
accommodating similar but not identical compounds. 45 Again, since brand
name and off-patent biologics are unlikely to be completely bioequivalent,
off-patents cannot benefit from 505(j).46 Yet, to the extent there is
bioequivalence under §505(j), the off-patent biologic applicant can rely on a
previous finding of safety and effectiveness under §505(b)(2).47 Where no
bioequivalence exists, the off-patent applicant must supply data that
independently supports safety and effectiveness.48 The FDA cannot fill
gaps by delving into the proprietary data of the first generation drug.49 The
FDA contends that there is a legally significant difference between relying
on the finding of safety and effectiveness as occurs when bioequivalence is
proven under §505(j), versus relying on the underlying data itself.50
¶11

II. TRADE SECRETS AND THE TAKING CLAUSE
¶12
To answer whether the FDA’s reliance on a finding of safety and
effectiveness constitutes a taking with regard to off-patent biologics, it is
necessary to review the Supreme Court’s treatment of the Takings Clause.
The Takings Clause, found in the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution, protects property interests of private parties against
uncompensated government interference.51 A takings claim must be
grounded in some legal property right, such as a right to trade secret
42

Lincoln Tsang & Donald Beers, Follow-on Biological Products: The
Regulatory Minefield, GLOBAL COUNSEL LIFE SCIENCES HANDBOOK 109 (2004).
43
Id. But see Hearing, supra note 2, at 119 (written statement of Carole Ben
Maimon, Barr Laboratories; arguing for approval of generic biologics under
§355(j)).
44
21 U.S.C. §355(b)(2).
45
See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 23, at 394-95. See also Tsang & Beers,
supra note 42, at 110.
46
Tsang & Beers, supra note 42, at 109.
47
FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, APPLICATIONS COVERED BY SECTION
505(B)(2) (DRAFT GUIDANCE) 2-3 (1999) [hereinafter DRAFT GUIDANCE].
48
See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 23, at 394-95.
49
See Hearing, supra note 2, at 65 (Questions to Dr. David Crawford).
50
Id.
51
U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”).
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protection, based on either a state or federal statute.52 Many state laws
follow the Restatement of Torts or the Uniform Trade Secrets Act in
defining property interests.53 Indeed, the FDA has relied on the
Restatement for its definition of trade secret:54 “A trade secret may consist
of any commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used
for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade
commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation
or substantial effort.”55 Courts have also construed the definition of trade
secret more narrowly, depending on the legislative context.56
¶13
It is conceivable that the Takings Clause does not recognize trade
secrets as a property right.57 One argument against trade secrets as a
property right is that the right to exclude in trade secrets is narrower than for
other types of property: a trade secret holder cannot prevent competitors
from using the once-secret if it was independently discovered58 However,
the Court has, in at least one instance, determined that trade secrets are a
property right subject to the Takings Clause. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,59
the statute in question was the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).60 FIFRA was passed in 1947 as a labeling and
licensing statute for pesticides, but was expanded in 1972 pursuant to fears
about the safety of pesticides and the possible harm that they posed to the
environment.61 Among other changes, the 1972 legislation authorized the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to rely on trade secrets or other

52

Ira S. Matsil, Comment, Government Seizures of Trade Secrets: What
Protection Does the Takings Clause Provide?, 48 SMU L. REV. 687, 698 (1995).
See also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, at 1001 (1984) (“[P]roperty
interests . . . are not created by the Constitution. Rather, they are created and
their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from
an independent source such as state law.” (quoting Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)).
53
See Matsil, supra note 52, at 698.
54
Richard Fortunato, Note, FDA Disclosure of Safety and Efficacy Data: The
Scope of Section 301(j), 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1280, 1289 (1984).
55
21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a) (2004).
56
See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704
F.2d 1280, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
57
See Richard Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets Under
the Takings Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 59 (2004) (presenting, but ultimately
rejecting, an argument that trade secrets are not property).
58
Id. See also Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011.
59
467 U.S. 986 (1984).
60
61 Stat. 163, as amended, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136 et seq. (2000).
61
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 991-92.
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confidential information to approve similar chemical compounds if the
beneficiary agreed to compensate the original innovator.62
The 1972 amendments spurred litigation about the extent of trade
secrets and other confidential information, and FIFRA was amended yet
again in 1978.63 The 1978 amendments provided that the EPA could not
rely on innovator data for ten years after the date of submission.64
However, after the ten years had passed, the EPA could rely on that data
without permission.65 Further, compensation for use of this data was
required only for 15 years after the date of submission.66

¶14

The Court in Monsanto held that the safety and effectiveness data
submitted by Monsanto to the EPA was a property interest cognizable by
the Takings Clause insofar as the information was protected by the laws of
Missouri as a trade secret.67 As the Court explained, trade secrets derive
their economic value from the competitive edge which they provide.68
Once they are disclosed, or used to evaluate other applications, their
economic value is extinguished or diminished, and the holder might have a
claim under the Takings Clause.69 Applying the Court’s reasoning, it will
be assumed for the purposes of this iBrief that brand name safety and
effectiveness data are trade secrets and subject to a takings analysis.

¶15

¶16
However, the question does not end there. For regulatory takings,
the government action also needs to be evaluated in light of the ad hoc
factors formulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New
York.70 The Penn Central Court set forth several factors relevant to whether
a taking has occurred: the character of the government action, the economic
impact of the action, and whether the government action has vitiated
reasonable investment-backed expectations.71

While not dispositive,72 the reasonable investment-backed
expectations inquiry is often the central focus of a regulatory takings
analysis.73 Reasonable investment-backed expectations played a prominent
¶17

62

Id. at 992-93.
Id. at 993-94.
64
Id. at 1006.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. at 1003-04.
68
Id. at 1012.
69
Id.
70
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
71
Id. at 124.
72
See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 635-36 (2001) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (reasonable investment-backed expectations should not be relied on
exclusively).
73
E.g., Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1005.
63
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role in Monsanto, a situation strikingly similar to the present debate. In
both situations, the government was concerned with ensuring public safety
in the face of potentially dangerous but valuable compounds. Brushing
aside the first two Penn Central factors, the Monsanto Court focused its
analysis on whether the agency action disrupted Monsanto’s reasonable
investment-backed expectations. The Court reasoned that whether or not
expectations were disrupted depended on the statutory scheme.74 The Court
held that the existence of a statute puts an innovator constructively on notice
of the limits of an agency’s authority with regard to the handling of
confidential information.75 The Court placed emphasis on the voluntary
submission of data: “[A]s long as Monsanto is aware of the conditions
under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related
to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an
applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can
hardly be called a taking.”76 Thus, a taking does not occur when there is a
voluntary exchange of information for a valuable government benefit and
the government provides notice that it has a license to use or disclose the
submitted information.77
¶18
This is a double-edged sword, however, since legislation affording
protection to certain forms of information will require compensation if
agency action violates the letter of the law.78 The Court held that with
regard to data submitted after the 1978 amendments, Monsanto could not
have a reasonable investment-backed expectation that its data would not be
treated as inviolate, since the statute explicitly stated that the data would not
receive such treatment.79 Similarly, before 1972, the statute was silent
about the agency’s obligations and provided no “express promise” to an
innovator.80 However, under the 1972 amendments, applicants were given
the opportunity for compensation by labeling data as confidential.81
Therefore, with regard to the time period after 1972 but before 1978, the
Court did find that Monsanto could have reasonable investment-backed
expectations of nonuse and nondisclosure.82

74

See id. at 1005-07.
Id. at 1007.
76
Id.
77
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987)
(discussing Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1007).
78
Monsanto, 467 U.S. at 1010-11.
79
Id. at 1006.
80
Id. at 1008.
81
Id. at 1011.
82
Id. at 1010-11.
75
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III. DO BRAND NAME BIOLOGIC MAKERS HAVE “REASONABLE
INVESTMENT-BACKED EXPECTATIONS”?
Within even the broader “muddle”83 of takings case law, the
reasonable investment-backed expectations test has been characterized as
“at best useless and at worst mischievous.”84 Indeed, numerous attempts
have been made to clarify the concept and give it analytical teeth.85 For
better or worse, however, the reasonable investment-backed expectation
notion of Penn Central is still used frequently by the Court.86
¶19

¶20
Attempts to determine whether there are reasonable investmentbacked expectations in a given situation can proceed in one of two
fashions.87 A bottom-up analysis begins with investor expectations and then
evaluates reasonableness. Indeed, expectations can be evaluated by risk
analysis,88 or under a competing view, through evaluating the web of social
and historical understandings about property rights.89 Both assays are too
complicated to complete meaningfully in this iBrief. By contrast, a topdown analysis begins with the statutes that shape expectations and evaluates
whether or not they provide notice. While in theory, top-down and bottomup approaches should yield the same result, the situation at hand admits
more easily to a top-down analysis, since it is more feasible to analyze the
notice-giving effect of statutes.90
¶21
Legislative schemes that shape expectations and provide notice can
come in three varieties.91 Legislation can prohibit use or disclosure, provide
for use or disclosure, or remain silent on the issue.92 If legislation prohibits
the use or disclosure of the trade secret, the holder has a strong case for a
taking if the government acts contrary to the statute.93 At the other end of

83

Thomas F. Cotter, Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the
Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 529 n. 1 (1998).
84
See Epstein, supra note 57, at 65.
85
See generally David R. Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations in Taking
Law, 27 URB. LAW. 215 (1995) (providing a survey of different approaches in
analyzing the reasonable investment-backed expectations test).
86
See generally David R. Mandelker, The Notice Rule in Investment-Backed
Expectations, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
PERSPECTIVES 21 (Thomas E. Roberts, ed. 2002).
87
See Mandelker, supra note 85, at 227.
88
Id. at 227-30 (describing Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 524 (1986)).
89
Id. at 230-32 (describing Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal
Thought, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1520, 1552 (1992)).
90
Id. at 227-31.
91
See Matsil, supra note 52, at 707.
92
Id.
93
Id.
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the spectrum, if legislation affirmatively provides for the disclosure or use
of trade secret information, the trade secret holder is put on notice, and
consequently has no claim under the Takings Clause.94 Finally, if
legislation is silent about the use or disclosure of trade secrets, then it may
be appropriate to look to the circumstances at the time the trade secret was
submitted, including regulations.95

A. Is there notice for the use of trade secret information for biologics
approved under the FDCA?
¶22
Does the FDCA provide explicit notice that the FDA will not rely
on earlier findings of safety and efficacy in approving later applications for
biologics originally approved under the FDCA? If the FDCA provides such
notice, then any action against the statute will constitute a taking. Critics of
off-patent biologics have asserted that the FDCA expressly provides for the
protection of data under section 301(j).96 Section 301(j) prohibits, in
relevant part,

the using by any person to his own advantage, or revealing, other than
to [certain government officials and the courts, relevant], any
information acquired under the authority of [a number of FDCA
sections, including §505] concerning any method or process which as
a trade secret is entitled to protection.97

The FDA also requires those who accept a commission with the Department
of Health and Human Services to affirm that they will not, “use this
information to further [their] private interests or the interests of any other
person.”98 It is conceivable that the FDA’s reliance on brand name data
would fall under the ambit of §301(j) if that section is given a broad
interpretation. The argument is that §301(j) prohibits the FDA from
approving an off-patent biologic application because relying on its earlier
finding of safety and effectiveness is a use of data prohibited by the
statute.99 While the FDA may not be using the information “for its own
advantage” it could be contended that they are furthering the interests of
another person; namely, the applicant for the off-patent biologic.

94

Id. at 707-08.
Id. at 710-14.
96
See Citizens Petition, supra note 7, at 12.
97
21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2000).
98
Food and Drug Administration, Regulatory Procedure Manual, Ch. 3,
Commissioning State and Local Officials, Acceptance of Commission, page 30
(2004).
99
See Citizens Petition, supra note 7, at 12-13.
95

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 4

Thus, it becomes critical to examine what “uses” are contemplated
by §301(j). Unfortunately, attention to the “use” prong of §301(j) has been
scant at best;100 most of the scrutiny has focused on the second prong which
prohibits disclosure.101 Most often, §301(j) is seen as a stopgap to agency
discretion for disclosure pursuant to Freedom of Information Act102
requests.103 The exemptions of the Freedom of Information Act remove
trade secrets from mandatory disclosure but still allow discretionary
disclosure as authorized by law.104 Yet even this discretion is foreclosed
because under §301(j) trade secrets are prohibited from disclosure and
therefore not authorized by law.105
¶23

This discussion about biologics brings to the surface a disturbing
contention: that even Hatch-Waxman’s generic drug approval process
affects an unconstitutional taking.106 Reading §301(j) broadly to include the
approval of follow-on applications as “a use to its own advantage” would
extend beyond FDCA-approved biologics, like insulin and human growth
hormone, to all drugs. The shortened approval process in either
circumstance could be characterized as the FDA using pioneer data for the
advantage of another. In this way, such a broad reading could frustrate the
aims of both §505(b)(2) and §505(j). Indeed, no suit has been filed by a
drug manufacturer asserting that the Hatch-Waxman Act violates the
Takings Clause.107
¶24

¶25
It seems most reasonable to construe §301(j) narrowly to
encompass a smaller subset of cases, such as the situation where an agency
employee, privy to confidential information, uses this information to
advance the interests of her brother-in-law, an aspiring investor. It is a
canon of statutory construction that “[a] statute should be construed so that
effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not destroy
100

S. Rep. 73-493 (1934) (only commenting that this section is a safeguard to
manufacturers).
101
See, e.g., Fortunato, supra note 54.
102
5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
103
See Fortunato, supra note 54, at 1282.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
See DONALD O. BEERS, GENERIC AND INNOVATOR DRUGS: A GUIDE TO FDA
APPROVAL REQUIREMENTS 6-1 (1999) (arguing that the Hatch-Waxman Act might
be a taking, but no mention of §331(j)).
107
Id. at 6-1. There might be two reasons for this. First, brand name companies
may not believe that their data is actually being used. Second, they might
believe that there is use, but because of the exclusivity and patent term extension
benefits, they may believe that compensation already exists. Regardless, as a
matter of construction, Section 301(j) would be at odds with §§505(b)(2) and (j)
either way.
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another unless the provision is the result of obvious mistake or error.”108 On
the other hand, a narrow reading preserves the substance of both terms.109
Thus, with regard to §301(j), by construing use and “to his own advantage”
narrowly, the substance of §301(j), §505(b) and §505(j) can be preserved.110
Therefore, while there is ample room for argument, it seems safe to say that
the FDCA does not provide an explicit promise that a finding of safety and
effectiveness for one FDCA-approved biologics application cannot be used
as a basis for the approval of a follow-on application.111

B. Does the FDCA affirmatively enable FDA action?
¶26
Since there is no explicit guarantee in the FDCA that the FDA
cannot rely on previous findings, the next question is whether the FDCA
affirmatively enables FDA action. Sections 505(j) and, in theory, 505(b)(2)
of the FDCA could be cited to support this view. Both of these sections
enable, to different degrees, the FDA to rely on earlier findings to approve
generics with the limitation that the original application be approved under
the §505 pathway of the FDCA.112 Section 505(j) allows a generic drug
manufacturer to take advantage of an Abbreviated New Drug Application
(ANDA) if, among other statutory requirements, the generic drug is
bioequivalent to the brand name drug.113 In an ANDA application, the
generic applicant is not required to submit studies demonstrating safety and
effectiveness.114 Section 505(b)(2) is similar to the ANDA pathway,
however, it allows for greater flexibility.115 A generic applicant is allowed
to rely on a finding of safety and effectiveness to the extent that the two

108

Anderson v. Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 944 (10th Cir. 1990)
(quoting J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 at
104 (C. Sands 4th ed. rev. 1984)).
109
See id.
110
Similar reasoning was used by the court in Public Citizen Health Research
Group v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1288-89 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The canon was used
to construe the meaning of trade secrets narrowly in the context of the Freedom
of Information Act. A broad construction would engulf the substance of
“commercial information”, which was also protected in the statute.
111
See also Letter from John C. Yoo, Professor of Law, representing the Generic
Pharmaceutical Association, to Sen. Orrin Hatch 9-10 (Oct. 21, 2004) (also
arguing that 301(j) does not create reasonable investment-backed expectations).
112
See 21 C.F.R. § 314.101(e)(1) (2004).
113
21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
114
Id.
115
See Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 23, at 394-95; see also Tsang & Beers,
supra note 42, at 110.
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compounds are bioequivalent; to the extent that they are not, the generic
applicant must submit data demonstrating safety and effectiveness.116
By their language, Sections 505(j) and (b)(2) apply to all drugs.117
In this way, these provisions would apply to insulin and human growth
hormone, since even though they would be considered biologics under a
rough definition, they were approved under the FDCA, and are referred to
as drugs.118 Indeed, there is nothing within Section 505(j) or (b)(2) that
indicates that those sections only apply to drugs which admit to a
straightforward classification.119 Thus, it seems that the existence of both
statutes should put brand name manufacturers on notice that the FDA will
rely on previous findings for certain biologics classified as drugs.
¶27

C. Is there another basis for investment-backed expectations?
¶28
Even if the appropriate legislation is silent or unclear, regulations
can still shape reasonable investment-backed expectations.120 In TriBio
Laboratories, Inc. v. United States,121 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit held that a government regulation created reasonable
expectations when it required that data from a first generation application
could not be used to support a follow-on application unless the original
submitter had consented.122 In TriBio, a pharmaceutical manufacturer
attempted to obtain approval for a veterinary pharmaceutical called
Gentaject, which was used for inoculating one day -old chicks against
harmful bacteria.123 Reasonable investment-backed expectations were
created in light of a regulation relating to New Animal Drug
Applications.124 That regulation stated that, “any reference to information
furnished by a person other than the applicant may not be considered unless
its use is authorized in a written statement signed by the person who
submitted it.”125 A similar provision applies to New Drug Applications
under the Hatch-Waxman Act, providing that an applicant can only
reference data in a previous application when it obtains a right to reference
that data from the submitter.126
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21 U.S.C. §355(b)(2); see also Leuenberger-Fisher, supra note 23, at 39495.
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21 U.S.C. §355(j), (b)(2).
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See Intercenter Agreement, supra note 32, at III(A)(6).
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21 U.S.C. §355(j), (b)(2).
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Tri-Bio Labs., Inc. v. United States, 836 F.2d 135, 140-41 (3d Cir. 1987).
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836 F.2d 135 (3rd Cir. 1987).
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Id. at 140-41.
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Id. at 136.
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Id. at 140-41.
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21 C.F.R. § 514(a) (1987).
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21 C.F.R. § 314.50(g)(3) (2004).
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However, this provision does not create reasonable expectations
regarding the non-use of a finding of safety and effectiveness. The
approval-shortening measures put in place by the Hatch-Waxman Act
specifically provide for situations where the new applicant does not have a
right to reference the data in the brand name application. In other words,
even though an applicant does not have a right of reference, 505(b)(2) still
provides a framework for the FDA to rely on previous findings of safety
and effectiveness. No comparable statute existed for animal drugs in TriBio.127 Section 505(b)(2) provides that when there is no right to reference,
an applicant can obtain approval, but only if further statutory requirements
are met.128 Under §505(b)(2), as described above, the FDA is authorized to
rely on previous findings of safety and effectiveness, without actually
delving into the data of the first application.129 On the one hand, investors
would have reasonable investment-backed expectations that the FDA would
not allow an off-patent applicant to rely on an innovator’s application to
“fill gaps” in the off-patent application. On the other hand, investors would
not have reasonable expectations, grounded in regulation, that the FDA
would not rely on a finding of safety and effectiveness when the applicant
did not have a right to reference, in light of §505(b)(2).
¶29

CONCLUSION
The high prices of biologic therapies make it imperative that
generic or off-patent products be marketed as options for consumers after
patent and exclusivity protections for manufacturers have expired. Brand
name companies argue that the FDA cannot make off-patent biologics
available without using proprietary data protected by the Takings Clause of
the U.S. Constitution. A Takings analysis here hinges on whether the
property holders had reasonable investment-backed expectations concerning
the confidentiality of their information for biologics classified as drugs
under the FDCA. This iBrief argues that § 301(j) of the FDCA did not
create expectations of confidentiality. Furthermore, sections 505(j) and
(b)(2) actively created expectations that the FDA would rely on previous
findings of safety and effectiveness. Lastly, the FDA has not promulgated
any regulations that that create reasonable expectations about
confidentiality. Consequently, it is unlikely that the approval of off-patent
biologics originally approved under the FDCA would be a taking. For this
subset of biologics, brand name manufacturers had notice, under the HatchWaxman amendments, that the FDA would consider follow-on products in
light of previous safety and effectiveness findings.130
¶30
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